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Why some politicians are more dangerous than others, by James Gilligan, Cambridge, 
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The global financial crisis has generated a renewed interest in the issue of inequality, its 
impact on the economy and on the social consequences for society more generally. There has 
been a spate of recent publications on the topic, for example, Stiglitz’s The price of inequality 
(2012) and Galbraith’s Inequality and instability (2011). More specifically, there have been a 
number of interdisciplinary books in epidemiology and social science which focus on 
identifying statistical relationships between economic inequality, usually using some 
summary measure of income distribution as its proxy, and a host of social indicators such as 
crime, health, education, drug abuse and social mobility. The spirit level (Wilkinson and 
Pickett 2009) is a prime example of this literature, and James Gilligan’s book, Why some 
politicians are more dangerous than others, fits into that genre in so far as it plots a 
relationship between the political affiliation of the US president, as a proxy for 
unemployment and inequality, and the rate of lethal violence in the USA over the past 
100 years. 
Why some politicians are more dangerous than others describes itself as a murder mystery 
with two separate ‘facts’ to be solved, namely, why do homicide and suicide rates tend to 
increase and decrease together, and, why do these rates of murder and suicide fluctuate so 
enormously? As a first step, Gilligan combines homicide and suicide rates into a single 
‘violent death rate’ and employs this as the principal variable for his analysis. Tracking this 
‘violent death rate’ from 1900 to 2007, Gilligan detects what he calls a pattern of ‘peaks and 
valleys’. Specifically, he identifies three ‘large, sudden and prolonged increases and 
decreases’ which he then classifies as epidemics of lethal violence which are interspersed 
with periods of more normal rates of lethal violence. Investigating this mystery, Gilligan 
finds a relationship between what he calls total lethal violence rates, that is, the homicide and 
suicide rates combined (and in particular these six data events), and the political party then in 
power. Gilligan claims that suicide and homicide rates increase when a Republican President 
is in office and decrease under Democratic Administrations. So the mystery now to be solved 
is the correlation between the president of the USA and rates of lethal violence – that is, ‘to 
discover the casual mechanisms by which a change in the party of the president can lead 
more people to kill themselves or others?’ Gilligan identifies a chain of evidence and his 
clear, unambiguous, answer goes as follows: economic and social distress in the form of 
unemployment, poverty, social status, etc. stimulate feelings of shame and humiliation, which 
in turn lead to an increase in the rate of both suicide and homicide; Republican 
administrations, it is claimed, increase levels of socio-economic distress whilst Democratic 
ones reduce them; therefore, suicide and homicide rates can be expected to rise under the 
Republicans and decrease under the Democrats. The implications of solving this mystery are, 
he says, 
rather stark: the Republican party functions as a risk factor for lethal violence and the 
Democratic party functions as a protective factor … the choice between electing Republicans 
and Democrats to the White House is a choice between life and death. 
Gilligan is clearly passionate about his subject and offers some interesting observations on 
the culture of mass incarceration, the workings of the prison system in the USA, and on the 
psychological links between shame, humiliation and violence. In terms of its central premise, 
however, the book has what might be called a ‘Michael Moore’ quality – a grand narrative, 
obfuscation of detail and utter conviction in its worldview. Ultimately, the central thesis of 
this book is neither credible nor persuasive in its line of argument. 
The first fundamental difficulty stems from combining suicide and homicide rates into a 
single combined rate of lethal violence. Homicide and suicide, in and of themselves, and in 
comparison to each other, depend on several demographic characteristics. They vary 
enormously by race, age, gender and location. For example, according to the US National 
Centre for Health Statistics, the most recent figures reveal about 35,000 suicides and about 
18,000 homicides a year in the USA, with men accounting for about 80% of both. 
Furthermore, white males commit suicide at much higher rates than black males or black or 
white females; indeed 73% of all suicides are committed by white males. Age, which Gilligan 
does adjust for, is a crucial factor in suicide both in the USA and around the world with older 
persons having the highest suicide rates. Psychiatric illness is the primary driver with about 
90% of all suicides committed by someone with a diagnosable mental or substance abuse, 
disorder. Homicide in the USA has been decreasing continuously since 2000 (from 9.8 per 
100,000 persons in 2000 to 4.8 in 2010) but the USA is still an outlier compared to most 
other industrialised countries who have rates below the 2.5 mark (e.g. neighbouring Canada, 
and European countries such as Ireland, the UK, Germany, France and the Netherlands). 
Gilligan is asking us to reconsider how we might normally think of homicide and suicide as 
distinct categories of ‘bad’ and ‘mad or sad’, with their respective behaviours residing within 
the individuals rather than in the material context in which they live (I discuss this further 
below). However, even allowing that he makes a case for a combined category of violent 
death, it is still incumbent on him to show the two rates separately rather than only his single 
combined violent death rate. More generally, the book boasts of ‘the most complicated 
statistical analysis’, yet evidence of this is scant. References to complimentary academic 
journal articles or conference presentations where the reader could locate such analysis are 
lacking. More specifically, we are not given graphs or tables of homicide or suicide rates or 
the significance level of any correlation. Indeed, the only graph we are given, namely Figure 
1 on page 12, shows the total lethal violence rate, yet from this we are unable to view the 
coordinates of what, for Gilligan, is the first mystery to be solved, that is, why do homicide 
and suicide rates increase or decrease together? Not only do we have to take it on faith that 
they do but there is not even a polite nod in the direction of the considerable literature which 
suggests that the two rates are not positively correlated, and further, that the homicide rate is 
actually inversely related to the suicide rate (e.g. Bills and Guohua 2005, Rezaeian 2011). 
Indeed, statistical analysis for 86 countries (UN 1998) indicates there is no correlation 
between suicide and homicide rates (r = 0.08). 
The reality that countries with low suicide rates may have low (Greece) or high (Mexico) 
homicide rates while countries with high suicide rates may have low (Japan) or high (Russia) 
homicide rates also highlights the dangers of simply adding these two rates together. 
Specifically, in relation to homicide and suicide rates in the USA over the period 1900–1998, 
analysis shows a weak correlation (r = 0.25) with the only time in 99 years when increases in 
suicide and homicide coincided being the early 1930s (Stolinsky and Stolinsky 2000). 
A second fundamental flaw in this book is Gilligan’s insistence that it is the party affiliation 
of the President that is the key determinant in relation to increases or decreases in the rates of 
violent death. He argues that Republican presidents, through their policies, cause the violent 
death rate to rise and thus ‘it is clear that the Republican Party is as responsible, as say, the 
man who pulls the trigger of the gun’. Firstly, Gilligan’s thesis does not hold true under either 
Eisenhower or Carter as there were neither increases nor decreases in the violent death that 
their political affiliation was meant to ensure. This messy disparity is catered for by Gilligan 
in his explanation that Eisenhower was ‘only nominally a Republican’ but really more of a 
Democrat, while Carter as a Southern Democrat was really a Republican as ‘he talked about 
feeling more comfortable with the Republicans!’ 
The main problem, however, is the overriding assumption that the President is all powerful, 
that he operates in a vacuum devoid of the constraints of Congress or the Supreme Court (or 
of the individual States themselves) and that Democrats and Republicans are different 
species. The argument, however, is not as straightforward as the author would have us 
believe. The late Gore Vidal argued 
there is only one party in the United States and that is the Property party … and it has two 
right wings: Republican and Democrat. Republicans are a bit stupider, more rigid, more 
doctrinaire in their lasissez faire capitalism than the Democrats, who are cuter, prettier, a bit 
more corrupt – until recently … and more willing than the Republicans to make small 
adjustments when the poor, the black, the anti imperialists get out of hand. But essentially 
there is no difference between the two parties. (Vidal 1977) 
Vidal, like Gilligan, tends to use a machete when a knife will do, but Vidal is correct to the 
extent that the differences between the two parties are not so large as commonly asserted, nor 
do the differences represent alternatives between neoliberal conservatism and a radical 
alternative. It is perhaps more accurate to say the right wing of the Republican Party is a party 
unto itself, albeit with the odd foray into the mainstream, and that there is no real left wing to 
the Democratic party. The majority of Democrats are centrists as are a lot of Republicans, 
while the President – regardless of party affiliation – is constrained by Congress (the House 
of Representatives and the Senate) in what he can or cannot achieve during his term(s) of 
office. As Obama’s Presidency clearly demonstrates, a Democratic president means a 
different thing depending on whether or not there is a ‘Democratic’ Congress. In addition, 
and even more recently, the issue of health insurance highlighted the policy importance of the 
Supreme Court. When both the White House and Congress are held by one party, the room 
for policy manoeuvre is greatly improved, and it would have been interesting to see if 
Gilligan’s proposition held under those conditions – that is, if the Republicans had controlled 
all three positions of power during the three ups in violent deaths and the Democrats had 
controlled all three positions of power during the three downs. 
A key period in Gilligan’s analysis is the Great Depression of the 1930s which corresponds 
with one of the three epidemics of violent death and which entered its valley phase with 
Roosevelt’s election and the onset of the New Deal. Gilligan, of course, attributes this valley 
phase to the fact that a Democrat was President and that ‘from the time he first entered office 
he began taking radical emergency action that had the effect of reversing the contraction into 
an expansion’. Discussions of the New Deal and its impact are very much in vogue, given the 
current economic state of the USA and many other countries, and the corollary contentious 
debate between the austerity route to reduce debt or a more Keynesian style intervention to 
stimulate growth. There is much debate and revision on whether the policies pursued by 
Roosevelt actually turned a recession into a depression; on the first new deal (1933–4) vs. the 
second new deal (1935–38); whether it was actually Hoover who introduced the policies in 
the first place; the role of the second world war in economic recovery; the issue of fiscal 
stimulus vs. monetary policy; and, the abandonment of the gold standard. For present 
purposes, however, the crucial point is that Roosevelt’s new policies and programmes only 
passed Congress with bipartisan support. Moderate and Liberal Republicans played a role in 
supporting the New Deal while the Supreme Court played its role in ruling certain legislation 
constitutional or unconstitutional (e.g. the Agricultural Adjustment Act and the National 
Industrial Recovery Act). 
The book is strongest on Gilligan’s home turf, namely, the emotion of shame. Gilligan is 
Clinical Professor of Psychiatry at New York University and he draws convincingly on his 
previous academic research on the relationships between shame, guilt and violence and on his 
work as the Director of Mental Health Services for the Massachusetts prisons and prison 
mental hospital. In relation to prison systems, he provides interesting information and insights 
on the culture of prisons, on the various rehabilitative and therapeutic programmes available 
to prisoners and on the crucial role education prison programmes can play in preventing 
recidivism. In relation to shame, Gilligan’s thesis is that the immediate psychological cause 
of violent behaviours in individuals is being subjected to high levels of humiliation and the 
attendant feelings of inferiority, disrespect and rejection. He argues that ‘the more shamed 
they feel the more likely they are to conceal their shame behind a mask of bravado or 
violence’ and that this violence can be towards others, as in homicide, or can be redirected 
onto the self, as in suicide. This sense of shame is greatly increased in times of economic 
stress, with high unemployment and loss of social status. There is no doubt that Gilligan is 
highlighting an important determinant of both homicide and suicide, but to argue that it is the 
driving force behind both statistics demands too great a leap of faith. 
In focusing on the feelings of inferiority, there are echoes of Wilkinson and Pickett’s book, 
among others, about the psychosocial effects of high inequality and the benefits of reducing 
social inequalities. While the psychological impact of the contextual effects of inequality on 
health and other social problems is both important and influential; there is no 
acknowledgement given to the other viewpoints in this well-established academic debate 
including the rival neo-materialist account (e.g. Smith and Pearce 2003). Economic and 
social inequality and the material and structural conditions of poverty matter in and of 
themselves – not just in terms of psychological disadvantage. Thus, neomaterialists would 
argue that it is not necessary to feel socially inferior in order to face a higher risk of poor 
health. Within the vast literature on this topic there is growing agreement that the 
fundamental causes of health and social inequalities lie in material inequalities and that 
psychosocial issues (including health behaviours) may be among the pathways through which 
relative or material deprivation works. In this light, it is interesting to note the significant 
body of research on the relationship between socio-economic variables, particularly 
unemployment, and suicide and homicide rates. This literature suggests that unemployment is 
a significant and robustly positive determinant of suicide rates for both men and women (Koo 
and Cox 2007). Results tend to be more inconclusive in relation to homicide rates which in 
turn underscore the point that these rates may not move together. 
There is a lack of gender analysis both in the discussion of homicide and suicide rates, and in 
Gilligan’s discussions of shame and humiliation, which undermine the claims of the author. 
The chapter devoted to the discussion of shame, guilt and violence is entitled ‘what kind of 
man are you?’ and turns on the notion of shame for men when they are no longer able to fulfil 
their role as breadwinner and provider for their families. Gilligan’s analysis extends to over a 
100-year period, but there is no recognition of how both the actual role of women and the 
stereotype of women’s position in society have changed dramatically. In terms of poverty and 
socio-economic stress, women constitute the majority of the poor in the USA and they also 
constitute the majority of lone parents both in and outside of the paid labour market. And 
finally, for such a lengthy discussion of shame, humiliation and violence, it seems 
incongruous not to mention domestic violence – a crime largely perpetuated by men against 
women. 
Despite all the limitations described above, Gilligan’s big picture – that politics matter and 
that more equality (be it of respect, recognition or resources) is beneficial at both an 
individual level and for society as a whole – is certainly valid. The difficulty, however, for all 
of us interested in issues of equality is that it is not always as straightforward a story as we 
would like it to be. Equality can be defined in terms of individuals and a wide variety of 
groups; it can relate to many different dimensions of people’s lives and it can refer to many 
different types of relationships, with all of these differences having some kind of basis in the 
idea of treating people as equals. Thus far from being a single idea, there are many 
conceptualisations, causes and historical, political and cultural contexts of equality. Each of 
these equality frameworks and objectives may have very different implications, and in 
particular, may conflict. Noble (2010) in his review of The spirit level argues that even the 
concept of a causal chain is too simplistic and that a causal web in which there is a complex 
interconnected network of cause, and effect is a more likely explanation for some of the 
correlations between inequality and various social ills. It thus does not seem likely that 
changing one factor, such as the party affiliation of the Presidency, will change the outcome 
in relation to homicide and suicide rates without a lot of factors changing and changing 
simultaneously. However, a constant revisiting of socio-economic inequality, which 
underscores the importance of politics and policy in influencing inequalities is crucial, as is 
the continued empirical critique of the erroneous assumption of a simple conflict between 
social equity and economic efficiency. 
© 2012, Sara Cantillon 
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